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BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 Nancy Mardell appeals from the grant of summary 
judgment for defendant Harleysville Life Insurance Company 
("Harleysville") by the District Court for the Western District 
of Pennsylvania in an employment discrimination suit alleging age 
and gender discrimination. Mardell brought several claims 
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title 
VII"), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1981 & Supp. 1994), the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 
621-34 (1985 & Supp. 1994), and the Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Act, 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 951-63 (1991 & Supp. 1994). The 
district court relied upon the rule pioneered by the Tenth 
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Circuit Court of Appeals in Summers v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988) to hold 
that Harleysville's "after-acquired evidence" of Mardell's 
alleged résumé fraud provided a complete defense to Mardell's 
causes of action.  "After-acquired evidence" in an employment 
discrimination case denotes evidence of the employee's or 
applicant's misconduct or dishonesty which the employer did not 
know about at the time it acted adversely to the employee or 
applicant, but which it discovered at some point prior to or, 
more typically, during, subsequent legal proceedings; the 
employer then tries to capitalize on that evidence to diminish or 
preclude entirely its liability for otherwise unlawful employment 
discrimination. 
 We reject the Summers rule in favor of one 
circumscribing the use of after-acquired evidence to the remedies 
phase of an employment discrimination suit brought pursuant to 
Title VII or ADEA.0  We will therefore reverse the district 
court's order granting summary judgment to Harleysville, and 
                     
0Throughout the following discussion we will generally treat 
claims arising under Title VII and ADEA similarly insofar as no 
party has given us reason to distinguish between them for purpos-
es of the principal issue before us, and we have thought of no 
reason for doing so ourselves.  See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, 
Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121, 105 S. Ct. 613, 621 (1985) 
(applying Title VII precedent to ADEA because "the substantive 
[(but not the procedural or remedial)] provisions of ADEA `were 
derived in haec verba from Title VII'" (quoting Lorillard, Div. 
of Loew's Theatres, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584, 98 S. Ct. 
866, 872 (1978)); Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., No. 93-1333, Mem. 
op. at 20 n.10 (July ??, 1994); Miller v. Cigna Corp., No. 93-
1773, 1994 WL 283269, at *4, *12 n.7 (June 28, 1994); Smithers v. 
Bailar, 629 F.2d 892, 894-95 (3d Cir. 1980) (applying Title VII's 
framework to an ADEA claim). 
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remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY0 
 Harleysville hired Mardell as a Branch Life Manager in 
February 1988 to manage insurance agents.0  Mardell appears from 
the record to have been an accomplished life insurance agent.  (A 
57.) Before accepting the position with Harleysville, Mardell had 
been employed by Prudential Life Insurance Company ("Prudential") 
for eleven years.  (A 58, 66, 68.)  William Shelow, who was being 
promoted out of the position at Harleysville for which Mardell 
would be hired, had approached Mardell at Prudential about 
replacing him in his soon-to-be vacated position.  (A 69.)  
Shelow was familiar with Mardell's work at Prudential and felt 
that she would excel as a Life Manager for Harleysville.  (A 70.) 
 In December 1989, Mardell became the first Harleysville 
employee ever to be placed on probation.  William Forloine, 
                     
0For purposes of Harleysville's summary judgment motion, we view 
the facts in the light most advantageous to Mardell, and resolve 
all disputed issues of fact in her favor. 
 Inasmuch as some of the facts pertaining to Mardell's 
prima facie case of discrimination and to the immateriality of 
her misrepresentations are drawn from portions of Mardell's and 
others' depositions that Mardell did not make part of the record 
in the district court but submitted in her appendix to her brief 
to this Court, we as a court of review may not consider them for 
substantive purposes.  See FED. R. APP. P. 10(a), 30(a); Jaconski 
v. Avisun Corp., 359 F.2d 931, 936 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1966); Reed v. 
Amax Coal Co., 971 F.2d 1295, 1299 n.3 (7th Cir. 1992).  We 
mention that testimony just as informative background to flesh 
out the particulars of the dispute; we do not consider it on the 
merits. 
0During Mardell's tenure the job title was reclassified as a 
Regional Director. 
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Mardell's direct supervisor and Harleysville's senior vice-
president of marketing and sales, avowedly effected this action 
for poor performance, even though at the time he imposed the 
probation Mardell's work was improving and she had surpassed the 
yearly goal he had set for her (A 76-78; SA 94, 99, 165-66).  The 
terms of probation required Mardell to meet or exceed her quota 
every month at pain of dismissal, a requirement not imposed on 
any of her male peers or supervisors and one which set a standard 
that most of Harleysville's managers commonly failed to fulfill 
(A 76-77, 80, 133-34; SA 166). 
 In February 1990, Harleysville discharged Mardell, who 
then was 52 years old.  (A 15, 59.)  Four months later 
Harleysville hired a 40 year old male to replace her.  (A 131-
32.)  Harleysville attributed its termination decision to 
Mardell's poor work performance.  Specifically, Harleysville 
contends that during Mardell's tenure, sales declined in her 
region, as did the number of independent insurance agents with 
whom she maintained ongoing contact.  The company also faulted 
her for improperly implementing its new marketing plan, failing 
to learn to use its new computer system effectively, making poor 
presentations, and being unable to work suitably with some co-
workers and outside agents (SA 164-66). 
 Mardell disputes Harleysville's asserted reasons for 
its decision to discharge her, contending instead that gender 
and/or age discrimation was the cause.  Mardell combined the 
aforementioned circumstantial evidence of disparate treatment 
(having been the only person placed on probation and subjected to 
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a quota, and having been replaced by a younger man) with direct 
evidence of her supervisor's comments and attitudes indicative of 
sex and/or age bias.  She testified that Forloine had told her 
that as a female he had higher expectations of her; that she 
"wasn't one of the boys" and "couldn't be a good old boy;" that 
he did not think her position "was a job for a woman;" and that 
many of her agents would think of her "as a wife." She testified 
further that once he had accused her, without foundation, of 
missing work because she "just wanted to stay home and watch the 
soaps," and that she had become aware of a meeting before all the 
company's vice presidents and regional directors held after her 
termination at which he allegedly stated that he "would never 
have another female regional director."  (A 71, 73-75.)  She 
added that he had frequently mentioned her age and that he had 
told her once that she "should be home playing with [her] 
grandchildren."  (A 73.) 
 During discovery in the instant case, Harleysville 
unearthed several instances of employment application and résumé 
misrepresentation committed by Mardell.  First, Mardell 
represented that she had obtained a Bachelor of Science degree 
from the University of Pittsburgh, whereas in fact the university 
had never issued a diploma to her:  the university's records 
indicate that she has yet to complete all her work in two related 
courses required for her degree.  (A 82-84.)  Mardell attributed 
her misrepresentation to a mistaken belief that she had earned a 
Bachelor of Science degree.  She explained that she had belatedly 
completed and submitted all required work for those two courses 
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and had been informed by her professor that he would file a grade 
change report, but that for some unknown reason the university's 
official records never credited the supposed report.  (A 84, 96-
100.)  Notably, Harleysville apparently did not consider the 
possession of a college degree a prerequisite to employment as a 
Branch Life Manager, and was prepared to hire the "mental 
equivalent" of a college graduate.  (A 123.) 
 Second, Harleysville learned that Mardell had also 
misrepresented her professional experience on both her employment 
application and résumé.  Mardell had listed in the "employment 
history" section of the application form and the "professional 
experience" section of her résumé that she had served as a "writ-
er-interviewer" at a local hospital, as a therapist at a mental 
health center, and as a manager and public relations director at 
a hotel.  (A 58.)  Although Mardell had performed most of those 
tasks as she described them on those documents (A 60-64, 67-68, 
84-90, 104-05), in both documents she had (at a few points 
greatly) exaggerated some of her specific duties (A 63, 67-68, 
104; SA 131-32); misrepresented that the hospital and mental 
health care center positions were remunerated (in fact she took 
them on as unpaid field course work to earn college credit) (A 
61-62, 85, 89-90); and misstated the dates she had performed 
those activities (A 58, 90; SA 121, 145). 
 Buoyed by its admittedly post-termination discoveries, 
Harleysville moved for summary judgment.  It attached to its 
motion affidavits by Glyn Mangum, the vice-president of sales who 
had made the decision to hire Mardell, and Forloine.  Mangum 
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averred that he had relied on Mardell's application and résumé 
when considering her for the Branch Life Manager position and 
that, had he known of her misrepresentations, he would not have 
hired her.  (SA 84-85, 87.)  Forloine averred that he had 
considered Mardell's alleged college degree to be a "plus" when 
he interviewed her for the position; that, had he known of her 
misrepresentations at the time of her interview, he would have 
"strongly recommended that she not be hired;" and that, had he at 
any time apprehended her misrepresentations, he would have, 
consistent with Harleysville's policy as declared by the 
employment application form Mardell had completed, "terminated 
her immediately."  He added that, in context of what Harleysville 
now knows to be true about Mardell, it would not voluntarily 
reemploy her (SA 95, 99). 
 Basing its summary judgment motion on the after-
acquired evidence doctrine, Harleysville assumed arguendo that it 
had impermissibly discriminated against Mardell, but essentially 
contested Mardell's standing to sue and, in the alternative, 
questioned whether she had realized an injury (SA 61-71).  On 
April 27, 1993, the district court entered its Memorandum and 
Order granting Harleysville's motion (A 5).  In the process, it 
applied a variant of the Summers rationale adapted to résumé 
fraud cases and held that, because of her fraud in gaining her 
employment, Mardell had suffered no legally cognizable injury 
even if Harleysville had willfully discriminated against her on 
the basis of her age and/or sex.  Given that disposition, the 
court did not reach the question whether Mardell had made out a 
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prima facie case of sex and/or age discrimination.  This appeal 
followed (A 5).0 
 
II.  THE RELEVANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  General Background 
 Experience with the federal employment discrimination 
laws has culminated in the division of disparate treatment suits 
into three classes:  pure discrimination, pretext, and mixed-
motives cases.0 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 
93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973), as embellished by Texas Department of 
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct. 1089 
(1981) and St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 
(1993), establishes a flexible three-part model to allocate the 
shifting burdens of production in the first two classes of 
individual disparate treatment cases (pure discrimination and 
pretext).  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S. Ct. 
                     
0We exercise plenary review over the district court's grant of 
summary judgment, and employ the same standard applicable in the 
district court.  Davis v. Portline Transportes Maritime 
Internacional, 16 F.3d 532, 536 (3d Cir. 1994).  We affirm a 
grant of summary judgment if "`there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.'"  Id. at 536 n.3 (quoting FED. R. 
CIV. P. 56(c)). 
 The facts of this case transpired before the effective 
date of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the "1991 Act"), Pub. L. 
No. 101-166, 105 Stat. 1075 (1991).  Hence, the substantive and 
remedial changes made by the 1991 Act do not apply to this case, 
see Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1505-06 (1994), 
but occasionally we will make references to them and the 
accompanying legislative history because that material is 
generally informative. 
0For purposes of this opinion, we ignore the disparate impact 
theory of employer liability. 
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1775 (1989) supplies the procedure for proving intentional 
discrimination in mixed-motives cases.  Numerous opinions of this 
Court have explained the evidentiary regimes that the McDonnell 
Douglas/Burdine/Hicks line of cases and Price Waterhouse have 
established, but for the benefit of the untutored reader we 
summarize them in the margin.0 
                     
0In a case of failure to hire or promote, the plaintiff first 
 
must carry the initial burden under the statute of 
establishing a prima facie case of [unlawful] 
discrimination. This may be done by showing (i) that he 
belongs to a [protected category]; (ii) that he applied 
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was 
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his 
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after 
his rejection, the position remained open and the 
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of 
complainant's qualifications. 
 
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S. Ct. at 1824.  If the 
plaintiff succeeds, the burden of production transfers to the 
defendant to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for the employee's rejection."  Id.  In the unlikely event 
that the employer at this juncture remains silent, the case falls 
within the set of "pure discrimination" cases and "the court must 
enter judgment for the plaintiff." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 
S. Ct. at 1094. 
 If the defendant does introduce into evidence a 
legitimate reason for its actions, the case becomes a "pretext" 
case.  In that event the employer need not prove that the 
tendered reason actually motivated its behavior, as throughout 
this burden-shifting paradigm the ultimate burden of proving 
intentional discrimination rests at all times with the plaintiff.  
See id. at 253, 254, 256, 101 S. Ct. at 1093, 1094, 1095.  Once 
the employer answers its relatively light burden by articulating 
a legitimate reason for the unfavorable employment decision, the 
burden of production rebounds to the plaintiff, who must now show 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's explana-
tion is pretextual. 
 To accomplish this, the plaintiff must convince the 
factfinder "both that the reason was false, and that 
discrimination was the real reason."  Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752; 
see id. at 2754 ("It is not  
11 
                                                                  
yenough . . . to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must 
believe the plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimina-
tion." (emphasis in original)).  In other words, since the 
plaintiff's making out a prima facie case only shifts the burden 
of production to the employer, the employer need only articulate 
some legitimate reason for its action to meet the plaintiff's 
serve.  The factfinder's rejection of that proffered legitimate 
reason permits, but does not compel, a verdict for the plaintiff.  
See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749.  To prevail, the plaintiff must 
ultimately prove not that the illegitimate factor was the sole 
reason for the decision, but that the illegitimate factor was a 
determinative factor of the employment decision, that is, that 
but for the protected characteristic, the plaintiff would have 
been, for example, hired or promoted.  See Hazen Paper Co. v. 
Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993) (ADEA) (holding that "a disparate 
treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee's protected 
trait actually played a role in [the decisionmaking] process and 
had a determinative influence on the outcome"). 
 In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court borrowed the 
mixed-motives standard applied originally in a mixed-motives 
constitutional tort case, Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of 
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S. Ct. 568 (1977), and adapted 
it for mixed-motives cases under Title VII.  See Price 
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 248-50, 109 S. Ct. at 1789-90 (plurali-
ty); id. at 258-59, 109 S. Ct. at 1795 (White, J., concurring); 
cf. id. at 277-78, 109 S. Ct. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring); 
see also East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 
U.S. 395, 404 n.9, 97 S. Ct. 1891, 1897 n.9 (1977); International 
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 369 n.53, 97 S. 
Ct. 1843, 1872 n.53 (1977).  A mixed-motives case is one in which 
both legitimate and illegitimate factors contribute to the 
employment decision.  See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 232, 109 
S. Ct. at 1781 (plurality). Such a case differs from a pretext 
case in that the plaintiff must present evidence of illegal 
discrimination "sufficiently strong to shift the burden of proof 
to the employer," meaning that the plaintiff must adduce "direct 
evidence" of discrimination (that is, more persuasive evidence 
than the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine prima facie case).  See 
Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., No. 93-1333, Mem. op. at 22-23 (3d 
Cir. July ??, 1994); Miller, No. 93-1773, 1994 WL 283269, at *12 
n.6; Hook v. Ernst & Young, No. 92-3724, 1994 WL 283266, at *8-*9 
(3d Cir. June 28, 1994); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277-78, 
109 S. Ct. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
 To rebut a plaintiff's case-in-chief in a mixed-motives 
case (that is, once the plaintiff has met his or her burden of 
proving an illegitimate factor "played a motivating [or 
substantial] part in an employment decision"), the employer must 
prove that "it would have made the same decision even if it had 
not allowed [the illegitimate factor] to play such a role."  
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B.  Other Circuits' Approaches to After-Acquired Evidence 
 The courts of appeals have grouped into two primary 
(albeit splintered) camps regarding the relevancy of after-
acquired evidence of résumé and/or application fraud or employee 
misconduct on the job.0 
 
1.  Courts Finding After-Acquired Evidence May Bar Liability 
 The Tenth Circuit formed the first camp with its 
seminal Summers decision.  Summers held that after-acquired 
evidence, at least if material, bars all relief and hence 
effectively operates as a complete defense to liability.  Based 
on after-acquired evidence of Summers' rampant on-the-job 
misconduct,0 State Farm moved for summary judgment to diminish 
                                                                  
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45, 109 S. Ct. at 1787-88 
(plurality); see id. at 242, 109 S. Ct. at 1786 (plurality). The 
employer's rebuttal is thus an affirmative defense.  See id. at 
246, 109 S. Ct. at 1708 (plurality); id. at 259-60, 109 S. Ct. at 
1795 (White, J., concurring); id. at 261, 109 S. Ct. at 1796 
(O'Connor, J., concurring).  We note, however, that to the extent 
that Price Waterhouse barred all liability when the employer can 
show it would have taken the same action even had it not had any 
illegitimate motives, the 1991 Act overturned it.  See Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1075-76 
(codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (Supp. 
1994)). 
0The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to resolve this split 
during its next Term.  See McKennon v. Nashville Banner 
Publishing Co., 114 S. Ct. 2099 (1994).  At the time we heard 
oral argument, certiorari had not yet been granted in McKennon, 
and the parties asked the panel (and it agreed) to decide the 
case and not hold it in abeyance pending the probable grant of 
certiorari so that the case can proceed to a timely resolution.  
Cf. Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Tech. Univ., 114 S. Ct. 22 (1993) 
(dismissing the writ of certiorari in an after-acquired evidence 
case). 
0Summers, a claims adjuster for the defendant insurance company, 
had been reprimanded on several occasions for falsifying company 
records and had eventually been placed on probationary suspension 
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the relief Summers could recover were he to prevail at the 
liability phase of trial.  See Summers, 864 F.2d at 702-03.  The 
Tenth Circuit held that the after-acquired evidence of Summers' 
on-the-job misconduct would not only limit Summers' remedies, 
but, by precluding Summers from any relief, the evidence would 
effectively avert State Farm's liability. 
 The court understood that technically McDonnell Douglas 
presupposed that a defendant could avert liability only with a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory motive known to the employer at the 
instant of its actions.  See id. at 705.  Yet it reasoned -- 
apparently because State Farm would have fired him had it known 
of his transgressions -- that "while . . . after-acquired 
evidence cannot be said to have been a `cause' for Summers' 
discharge in 1982, it is relevant to Summers' claim of `injury,' 
and does itself preclude the grant of any present relief or 
remedy to Summers."  Id. at 708.  The court likened the 
plaintiff's situation to a "masquerading doctor," meaning one who 
was not really a doctor but who had pretended to be one, 
discharged for discriminatory reasons, who "would be entitled to 
no relief."  Id. 
 Since Summers, courts have allowed after-acquired 
evidence to bar the employer's liability in two general catego-
                                                                  
for two weeks.  About six months later, State Farm discharged 
him, not because of his falsification of records "but because of 
his poor attitude, inability to get along with fellow employees 
and customers, and similar problems dealing with the public and 
co-workers."  Four years later, during discovery, State Farm 
learned that on at least 150 occasions Summers had falsified 
company records, eighteen instances of which falsifications 
occurred after his return from suspended status. 
14 
ries of cases: résumé and/or application fraud cases, and 
misconduct on the job cases. In a case of résumé or application 
fraud, the employer typically asserts that, had it known of the 
plaintiff's misrepresentation(s), it would never have hired him 
or her.  See Welch v. Liberty Machine Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1403, 
____ WL at *1, *3 (8th Cir. 1994) (brought under the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1461 (1985 & 
Supp. 1994), and the Missouri Human Rights Act, MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 
213.010-.137 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1994)).  The employer may 
alternatively argue that, had it at any time after the hiring 
found out about the misrepresentation(s), it would have promptly 
fired the plaintiff.0  See O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 12 F.3d 
176, 177-78 (10th Cir. 1994) (expanding the Summers holding from 
misconduct to after-acquired résumé and application fraud cases), 
petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3757 (Apr. 1, 1994) (No. 
93-1728); Reed v. Amax Coal Co., 971 F.2d 1295, 1298 (7th Cir. 
1992) (per curiam).  In some cases employers advance both 
                     
0Some courts distinguish between "would not have hired" and 
"would have fired" cases on the basis that an employer would be 
more hesitant to fire a competent, capable employee than to not 
hire the applicant in the first place.  See, e.g., Washington v. 
Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250, 254, 255 n.5 (7th Cir. 1992).  
In Washington, the Seventh Circuit held that in cases where the 
employee actually was employed for some time, the "would not have 
hired" inquiry is irrelevant because "the temporal focus is on 
the time of the adverse employment decision."  Id. at 256.  As to 
the "would have fired" inquiry, however, the court somewhat 
inconsistently with its prior holding construed Price Waterhouse 
to allow the employer to defend its actions with after-acquired 
evidence, stating that in such situations "the employer must show 
by a preponderance of the evidence that, if acting in a race-
neutral manner, it would have made the same employment decision 
had it known of the after-acquired evidence."  Id. at 255 
(emphasis supplied). 
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arguments in the alternative.  See Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan 
Technological University, 975 F.2d 302, 304 n.2 (6th Cir. 1992), 
cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 22 (1993); Washington v. Lake County, 
Ill., 969 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir. 1992); Johnson v. Honeywell 
Information Systems, Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 414-15 (6th Cir. 1992);0 
cf. Dotson v. United States Postal Service, 977 F.2d 976, 978 
(6th Cir.) (per curiam) (holding that the plaintiff's employment 
application misrepresentations rendered him unqualified for the 
job without addressing whether the employer would not have hired 
or would have fired him therefor), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 263 
(1993).  Obviously in job misconduct cases (like Summers), only a 
variant of the latter "would have fired" argument can be made.  
Cf. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539, 542-
43 (6th Cir. 1993) (concluding that the plaintiff's job 
misconduct precluded her "claim of injury" and that consequently 
she was not entitled to "the grant of any relief or remedy"), 
cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2099 (1994). 
 
2.  Courts Finding After-Acquired Evidence May Not Bar Liability 
 The opposing camp, exemplified by the Eleventh Circuit 
in Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (1992) when it 
openly broke ranks with Summers,0 allows after-acquired evidence 
                     
0Although Johnson involved a cause of action under Michigan's 
Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 37.2101-.2804, 
the court construed it "in the same manner as its federal 
counterpart." 955 F.2d at 415 n.1. 
0The first court of appeals after-acquired evidence case actually 
rejecting Summers was handed down by the Seventh Circuit in Smith 
v. General Scanning, Inc., 876 F.2d 1315 (1989), an ADEA suit. As 
the employer brought out during discovery, the plaintiff had 
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to come in only at the remedies stage to slim down the relief 
                                                                  
falsified his college credentials on his résumé.  See id. at 
1317.  The district court had held that the plaintiff's 
misrepresentation precluded the plaintiff from making out a prima 
facie case because he could not show that he was qualified for 
the position.  The court of appeals, cognizant of the Summers 
decision, rejected the district court's approach: 
 
By narrowly focusing on [the plaintiff's] initial 
burden, the district court was distracted from the real 
issue in this case.  At issue is the lawfulness of 
Smith's termination.  His resume fraud clearly had 
nothing to do with that; it surfaced only after [the 
plaintiff] was terminated and after this suit was com-
menced.  Whether [the employer] discriminated against 
[the plaintiff] must be decided solely with respect to 
the reason given for his discharge . . . . His resume 
fraud is, for this purpose, irrelevant. 
 
Id. at 1319.  The court noted in dicta that such evidence would 
be relevant at the remedies stage, however, because "it would 
hardly make sense to order [the plaintiff] reinstated to a job 
which he lied to get and from which he properly could be 
discharged for that lie."  Id. at 1319 n.2. 
 But subsequent cases in the Seventh Circuit leave that 
courts' approach the most unsettled, as panel after panel seems 
at sea without seriously heeding what bearings have been set 
before.  See Gilty v. Village of Oak Park, 919 F.2d 1247, 1251 
(7th Cir. 1990) (not referencing Smith but holding that evidence 
of the plaintiff's fabrications exposed three years after the 
adverse employment decision would bar all liability); Washington 
v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250, 253 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(same, but noting that the plaintiff had not challenged the 
validity of the Summers rationale, and that he had not advanced 
the argument that he should at least, in accordance with the 
dicta in Smith, be accorded partial backpay); Reed, 971 F.2d at 
1298 (approving Summers but giving it a restrained reading); 
Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 985 F.2d 364, 369, 370 
(7th Cir. 1993) (departing from the reasoning of Washington and 
Reed without citing them, returning to Smith for the proposition 
that "the only issue is the lawfulness of the termination for the 
reasons given," and holding that "[a] discriminatory firing must 
be decided solely with respect to the known circumstances leading 
to the discharge").  Thus, while not exactly clear, the Seventh 
Circuit, after bouncing back and forth between the two camps for 
a while, seems now to have settled alongside Wallace.  See 
Kristufek, supra. 
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available to the plaintiff.0  The court, having had the benefit 
of the Supreme Court's exposition in Price Waterhouse (applying 
the Mt. Healthy framework to Title VII and clarifying the 
question of timing in mixed-motives cases, see supra at Error! 
Bookmark not defined. n.Error! Bookmark not defined.), criticized 
the Summers decision for misapplying Mt. Healthy, "in that the 
Summers rule ignores the lapse of time between the employment 
decision and the discovery of a legitimate motive for that 
decision."  Id. at 1179-80.  In doing so, the court continued, 
"the Summers rule clashes with the Mt. Healthy principle . . . 
that the plaintiff should be left in no worse a position than if 
she had not been a member of a protected class or engaged in 
protected opposition to an unlawful employment practice."  Id. at 
1179. 
 The Eleventh Circuit was also persuaded that the 
Summers rule would result in underenforcement of the federal 
anti-employment discrimination laws and accordingly underdeter 
unlawful employment discrimination.  See id. at 1179-80.  Having 
resolved that after-acquired evidence does not preclude 
liability, the court concluded with a detailed exposition on the 
                     
0In Wallace, the plaintiff (Neil) had filed numerous causes of 
action against the employer under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII 
for wrongful discharge.  During her deposition, Neil admitted 
having falsified her employment application by omitting a 
conviction on drug charges.  Soon thereafter, the employer Dunn 
filed a motion for summary judgment, partially grounded in the 
Summers defense.  See id., 968 F.2d at 1176-77. 
18 
availability of the standard remedies in after-acquired evidence 
cases.0 
 
III.  OUR APPROACH 
A.  The Liability Stage 
1.  After-Acquired Evidence Is Irrelevant at the Liability Stage 
 A quick review of the overarching framework erected for 
employment discrimination claims, see supra at Error! Bookmark 
not defined. n.Error! Bookmark not defined., discloses why after-
acquired evidence cannot be a defense to liability.  What sets an 
after-acquired evidence case far apart from a mixed-motives case 
                     
0With respect to reinstatement and front pay, the court held that 
those remedies would be inappropriate if the after-acquired 
evidence would have in and of itself led to the adverse 
employment action.  See id. at 1181-82.  An injunction against an 
employer's unlawful practices, it added, would not be available 
if the court did not also order the plaintiff reinstated.  See 
id. at 1182.  The court also determined, however, that after-
acquired evidence would not affect the availability of declarato-
ry relief.  See id. 
 According to the court, backpay should be awarded up 
until the date of judgment, unless the employer can prove that 
"it would have discovered the after-acquired evidence prior to 
what would otherwise be the end of the backpay period in the 
absence of the allegedly unlawful acts and this litigation."  Id.  
This division, the court explained, would fairly balance the 
employer's right to make lawful employment decisions and the 
employee's right to make-whole relief. Ending the backpay period 
when the employer actually discovered the evidence would not make 
the victim whole, the court maintained, insofar as absent the 
unlawful conduct and the resulting litigation, the employer would 
very likely not have detected the fraud or misconduct. See id. 
 Finally, with regard to the award of attorneys' fees, 
the court held that if the employee obtained "some benefit" from 
the lawsuit or if the litigation "materially altered" the 
parties' legal relationship, she would as a "prevailing party" be 
entitled to partial attorneys' fees; the after-acquired evidence 
could diminish the award by an amount arrived at using 
"traditional attorney fee principles." See id. at 1182-83. 
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like Price Waterhouse or a pretext case like McDonnell Douglas is 
that the articulated "legitimate" reason, which was non-existent 
at the time of the adverse decision, could not possibly have 
motivated the employer to the slightest degree.  After-acquired 
evidence, simply put, is not relevant in establishing liability 
under Title VII or ADEA because the sole question to be answered 
at that stage is whether the employer discriminated against the 
employee on the basis of an impermissible factor at the instant 
of the adverse employment action.  See Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1179 
(pointing out that "the Summers rule ignores the lapse of time 
between the employment decision and the discovery of a legitimate 
motive for that decision"). 
 The Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse held that in a 
mixed-motives case the employer could rely only on a legitimate 
motive it held at the time of the adverse employment decision.  
See 490 U.S. at 252, 109 S. Ct. at 1791 (plurality) ("An employer 
may not . . . prevail in a mixed-motives case by offering a 
legitimate and sufficient reason for its decision if that reason 
did not motivate it at the time of the decision." (emphasis 
supplied)); id. at 250, 109 S. Ct. at 1790 (plurality) (requiring 
the employer's legitimate, sufficient reason to have motivated 
the employer "at the moment of the decision"); id. at 241, 109 S. 
Ct. at 1785 (plurality) ("The critical inquiry . . . is whether 
[a protected characteristic] was a factor in the employment 
decision at the moment it was made." (emphasis in original)); id. 
at 259, 109 S. Ct. at 1795 (White, J., concurring) (stating that 
the employee must "show that the unlawful motive was a 
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substantial factor in the adverse employment action" (emphasis in 
original)); id. at 266-67, 109 S. Ct. at 1799 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) (stating that the employer must show that "despite 
consideration of illegitimate factors the individual plaintiff 
would not have been hired or promoted in any event"). 
 Thus, under the mixed-motives analysis, the employer in 
an after-acquired evidence case cannot contend that it would have 
reached the same decision at the time it was made absent the 
illicit motive. Concomitantly, under the pretext analysis, it 
should be simple for the employee to demonstrate beyond 
peradventure that the proffered legitimate (but after-acquired) 
reason was not the true cause for the decision but is merely a 
"pretext."  See, e.g., Eastland v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 704 
F.2d 613, 626 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that the employer's 
proffered non-discriminatory reason was pretextual because the 
employer was unaware of the proffered reason at the time it made 
its decision), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1066, 104 S. Ct. 1415 
(1984); cf. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 805, 93 S. Ct. at 
1824, 1826 (assuming that the employer was aware of the proffered 
reason at the time of the decision).  Although Summers reasoned 
not that the after-acquired evidence would avoid liability but 
instead that it would bar all remedies, the effect is the same, 
and therefore the Summers rationale entirely eviscerates the 
temporal holding in Price Waterhouse that an employer can rely on 
a non-discriminatory justification for its action only if that 
justification actually motivated it at the time of its decision. 
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 Having undermined the defendant's articulated 
legitimate explanation, under the standard employment 
discrimination burden-shifting scheme it would now be up to the 
factfinder to determine if the plaintiff met his or her burden of 
proving intentional discrimination.  By removing this basic issue 
from the factfinder, courts applying the after-acquired evidence 
doctrine depart from the settled framework.  Problematically, 
courts that allow after-acquired evidence to bar liability allow 
employers to make plaintiffs worse off for having a protected 
characteristic.  That is because presumably, absent the wrong 
done the employee, the employer would not have discovered the 
"legitimate motive" evidence (at least during the relevant time 
frame) and the employee would still be employed.  See Wallace, 
968 F.2d at 1179 (observing that the Summers rule "excuses all 
liability based on what hypothetically would have occurred absent 
the alleged discriminatory motive assuming the employer had 
knowledge that it would not acquire until sometime during the 
litigation arising from the discharge" (some emphasis omitted)). 
 To assure that the plaintiff is restored to the 
position he or she would have occupied absent the employer's 
unlawful discrimination, when the employer's motive was 
exclusively discriminatory at the time of the decision (as is 
assumed arguendo in the Summers-type cases), a legitimate reason 
for the decision brought out later must not be used nunc pro tunc 
by the employer to justify its actions.  See Welch, 23 F.3d at 
____ WL at *4 (Arnold, J., dissenting) ("I think that the objects 
of deterrence and compensation both require us to examine a 
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defendant's mind for what it contained, not what it might have 
contained, to determine whether he has committed a wrong.").  An 
employer's (assumed) discrimination is a deplorable wrong, and 
the fact that the employer might have accomplished a like result 
without maltreating the employee by employing different, 
nonharmful means (from the point of view of federal law) -- that 
is, by relying on legitimate instead of discriminatory reasons -- 
is beside the point, since if only it had used the other, 
defensible means there would have been no injury and no cause for 
the lawsuit. 
 
2.  Victims of Invidious Employment Discrimination Have Standing 
 Some members of the no-liability camp advance the 
rationale that the plaintiff lacks standing because he or she was 
not qualified for the position (qualification being an element of 
the plaintiff's McDonnell Douglas prima facie case), an argument 
pertaining to the employer's de jure, as opposed to Summer's de 
facto, non-liability. See Dotson, 977 F.2d at 977-78; Gilty v. 
Village of Oak Park, 919 F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir. 1990).0   That 
argument, however, is at odds with Supreme Court precedent. 
                     
0Cf. Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d 109, 115-18 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(reaching the same conclusion as Dotson and Gilty that the 
plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case because he was 
unqualified, but there the employer had discovered the employee 
"lawyer" lacked a law degree before discharging him), cert. 
denied, 451 U.S. 985, 101 S. Ct. 2319 (1981); Mantolete v. 
Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the 
defendant to introduce after-acquired evidence to rebut the 
plaintiff's prima facie case of qualification, but cautioning 
that it would be improper for the employer to use such evidence 
to justify its decision). 
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 The plaintiff's McDonnell Douglas prima facie case was 
formulated to identify circumstances under which the 
discriminatory motive or intent of the employer may be inferred.  
See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2747 (describing that the plaintiff's 
prima facie case gives rise to a presumption of discriminatory 
intent, which the defendant must rebut with evidence of a 
legitimate reason); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54, 101 S. Ct. at 
1094 (explaining that the plaintiff's prima facie case must "give 
rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination"); Furnco Constr. 
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576-77, 98 S. Ct. 2943, 2949-50 
(1978) ("A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an 
inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, 
if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the 
consideration of impermissible factors."); Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 
358, 97 S. Ct. at 1866.  This reading is substantiated by the 
fact that the pliant McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is only 
one of many alternative routes available for a plaintiff to 
travel, amongst which is direct evidence bearing on discrimi-
natory intent.  See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 
460 U.S. 711, 715, 103 S. Ct. 1478, 1482 (1978).0  Consequently, 
what is relevant to the inquiry is the employer's subjective 
assessment of the plaintiff's qualifications, not the plaintiff's 
objective ones if unknown to the employer.0  In other words, the 
                     
0Even were the Dotson and Gilty "no standing" rationale 
persuasive in McDonnell Douglas type cases, it could not help the 
employer in cases (such as this one) where the plaintiff adduces 
direct evidence of disparate treatment. 
0Many courts construing Title VII or ADEA have so held.  See, 
e.g., Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 985 F.2d 364, 369 
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strength of the inference of discrimination based on the prima 
facie case is independent of the plaintiff's qualifications that 
were unknown to the employer. 
 The no-standing argument additionally runs counter to 
the plain meaning of Title VII and ADEA.  Those statutes grant 
standing to "any individual" discriminated against by a covered 
employer.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (1981); 29 U.S.C.A. § 
                                                                  
(7th Cir. 1993); Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1179; Smith v. General 
Scanning, Inc., 876 F.2d 1315, 1319 (1989); Sabree v. United Bhd. 
of Carpenters & Joiners Local No. 33, 921 F.2d 396, 402 (1st Cir. 
1990); Norris v. City & County of San Francisco, 900 F.2d 1326, 
1331 (9th Cir. 1990); Hill v. Seaboard C. L. R.R. Co., 767 F.2d 
771, 774 (11th Cir. 1985), aff'd on reh'g, 885 F.2d 804 (11th 
Cir. 1989); Cuddy v. Carmen, 762 F.2d 119, 127 & n.12 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1034, 106 S. Ct. 597 (1985); 
Eastland v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 704 F.2d 613, 626 (11th Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1066, 104 S. Ct. 1415 (1984); Lee 
v. National Can Corp., 699 F.2d 932, 937 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 845, 104 S. Ct. 148 (1983); cf. Price Water-
house, 490 U.S. at 252, 109 S. Ct. at 1791; Teamsters, 431 U.S. 
at 369 n.53, 97 S. Ct. at 1872 n.53 (illustrating that an 
employer may rebut a plaintiff's prima facie case by showing that 
"the nonapplicant's stated qualifications were insufficient" 
(emphasis supplied)); see also Regents of University of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 n.54, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2764 n.54 (1978) 
("Having injured respondent solely on the basis of an unlawful 
classification, petitioner cannot now hypothesize that it might 
have employed lawful means of achieving the same result."). 
 This temporal knowledge limitation distinguishes a 
statutory unlawful discrimination claim from a contractual 
wrongful termination claim.  In contract actions, if one party 
commits a material breach, the other party may generally use it 
to justify nonperformance even if, at the time of its own 
nonperformance, the second party was unaware of the first party's 
material breach.  See College Point Boat Corp. v. United States, 
267 U.S. 12, 15-16, 45 S. Ct. 199, 200-01 (1925); REST.2D CONTRACTS 
§ 385 cmt. a (1981); id. § 225 & cmt. e; id. § 237 & cmt. c; cf. 
id. § 164 (fraudulent inducement makes a contract voidable).  In 
a contract claim, questions like unidentified misrepresentations 
and the signing of an attestation clause are accordingly 
important.  But in our view it is specious to conflate the two 
very different causes of action. 
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623(a) (1985).  The result is no different if one focuses on the 
definition of "employee" rather than "individual," since both 
statutes define an "employee" as "an individual employed by an 
employer."  42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(f) (1981); 29 U.S.C.A. § 630(f) 
(1985).  The point is that neither definition contains an 
exception for individuals who would not have been employed by the 
employer but for their fraud or misconduct, or for employees who 
measured against some objectively defined criteria are "unquali-
fied." Congress having granted standing in the circumstances we 
consider here, the matter is settled.  See Kenneth G. Parker, 
Note, After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Cases:  
A State of Disarray, 72 TEX. L. REV. 403, 428 (1993) ("Simply put, 
the ability of the plaintiff to sue is delineated by the statute 
itself, and [the] remedy should be determined with reference to 
the dual purposes of making the plaintiff whole and deterring a 
discriminating employer."). 
 
3.  Victims of Invidious Employment Discrimination 
    Suffer Real and Legal Injury 
 Summers understood that "McDonnell Douglas clearly 
presupposes a `legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason' known to the 
employer at the time of the employee's discharge."  864 F.2d at 
705 (emphasis in original).  Summers reached its conclusion that 
the employer would not be liable for the different, practical (as 
opposed to legal) reason that, the plaintiff not having been 
"injured," he or she could obtain no relief.  We disagree. 
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 Reasoning that the plaintiff suffered no legal injury 
from invidious discrimination when after-acquired evidence 
reveals résumé fraud or work misconduct, see Summers, 864 F.2d at 
708 (assuming that the employer's decision was motivated by an 
illegitimate reason); McKennon, 9 F.3d at 541, 542 (same); 
Milligan-Jensen, 975 F.2d at 305 (same); Washington, 969 F.2d at 
255, 256-57 (same); Johnson, 955 F.2d at 415 (same), defies 
common sense.  Imagine, for instance, an employer which 
intentionally batters an employee who procured his or her 
position through fraud or who falsified company records.  The 
Summers rationale would bar the employee's recovery in an 
appropriate action because the employee had no "right" to be 
where he or she was at the moment of his or her injury.  Surely 
that result flies in the face of reason and the whole body of 
tort law.0  Accord Welch, 23 F.3d at WL at *4 (Arnold, J., 
dissenting). 
                     
0In Baab v. AMR Servs. Corp., 811 F. Supp. 1246 (N.D. Ohio 1993), 
the court concluded in context of an intentional-infliction of 
emotional distress claim tacked on to an employment discrimina-
tion suit that 
 
one could take the view that plaintiff should not 
complain of injury inflicted upon her at her workplace 
when, had the defendant been apprised of her 
wrongdoing, she would not have been there in the first 
place.  This argument . . . misses the mark.  The 
injury complained of here is injury to one's person and 
plaintiff is entitled to be free of that injury 
regardless of her status as a dischargeable employee. 
 
Id. at 1262.  But cf. Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 830 F. Supp. 
305, 306-08 (E.D. Va. 1993) (supplanting the Summers rationale to 
sexual harassment situations); Churchman v. Pinkerton's Inc., 756 
F. Supp. 515, 518-21 (D. Kan. 1991) (same); Mathis v. Boeing 
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 The rationale might have a stronger bite to it were the 
only injury to the victim the adverse employment action per se;0 
but, quite to the contrary, in an employment discrimination suit 
the traumatic injury is having been subjected to the adverse 
employment action because of one's race, sex, age, or other 
protected characteristic, that is, having been unlawfully 
discriminated against.  Put more dramatically, to maintain that a 
victim of employment discrimination has suffered no injury is to 
deprecate the federal right transgressed and to heap insult ("You 
                                                                  
Military Airplane Co., 719 F. Supp. 991, 994-95 (D. Kan. 1989) 
(same). 
 Indeed, even one whom the defendant knows to be a 
wrongdoer at the time of the defendant's actions is not too 
unworthy in the eyes of the law to recover for an unprivileged 
intentional or even a negligent tort.  See REST.2D TORTS § 889 & 
cmts. a, b (1979) ("One is not barred from recovery for an 
interference with his legally protected interests merely because 
at the time of the interference he was committing a tort or a 
crime . . . ."); id. § 890 (discussing privileges); cf. id. § 870 
& cmt. e (1979) ("One who intentionally causes injury to another 
is subject to liability to the other for that injury, if his 
conduct is generally culpable and not [privileged]."). 
 Certainly, the defendant who does not know that the 
victim is a wrongdoer at the time the tort is committed has no 
privilege to inflict the harm.  And it would seem that if one has 
no privilege --because there is missing some provocation or 
circumstance establishing the privileges of self-defense, defense 
of property, or defense of others -- to injure a known trespasser 
deliberately, a fortiori one has no such privilege with respect 
to someone invited onto the premises, albeit the invitation be 
procured through trick. 
0Although even were that the case an argument can be made that 
the plaintiff was still legally injured since, absent the 
discrimination, he or she would still have been employed and the 
employer presumably would not have exposed the fraud or 
misconduct for some unknown span of time.  See Massey v. Trump's 
Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314, 322 (D.N.J. 1993) 
("Absent those illegal motives, the employee would still be 
employed.  Thus, an illegal discharge causes an injury regardless 
of an employee's previous misconduct, and that injury must be 
subject to some redress."). 
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had it coming") upon injury.  Cf. Richard Granofsky & Jay S. 
Becker, After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination 
Cases, 36 DEF. 19, 24 (1994) (referring to such employees as 
"unworthy").  A victim of discrimination suffers a dehumanizing 
injury as real as, and often of far more severe and lasting harm 
than, a blow to the jaw.0  See H.R. REP. No. 40(I), 102d Cong., 
1st Sess. 15 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 553 
("The Committee intends to confirm that the principle of anti-
discrimination is as important as the principle that prohibits 
assaults, batteries and other intentional injuries to people.").   
 In the 1991 Act, Congress understood as much and 
changed the result reached in Price Waterhouse:  in cases decided 
                     
0See United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1872 (1992) ("It is 
beyond question that discrimination in employment on the basis of 
sex, race, or any of the other classifications protected by Title 
VII is, as . . . this Court consistently has held, an invidious 
practice that causes grave harm to its victims."); H.R. REP. No. 
40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1991) ("Victims of intentional 
discrimination often endure terrible humiliation, pain and 
suffering while on the job. This distress often manifests itself 
in emotional disorders and medical problems."), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 552; id. at 66-69 (documenting the disastrous 
effects of invidious discrimination on its victims), reprinted in 
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 604-07; Pauline Yoo, Note, The After-
Acquired Evidence Doctrine, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 219, 252 & 
n.201 (1993) ("Discrimination can damage a victim emotionally, 
psychologically, or physically."); id. at 243 & n.150 (same); 
Cheryl K. Zemelman, Note, The After-Acquired Evidence Defense to 
Employment Discrimination Claims:  The Privatization of Title VII 
and the Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L. REV. 175, 
199-200 (1993) [hereinafter Zemelman, The After-Acquired Evidence 
Defense]; see also Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 
§ 107(b), 105 Stat. 1075-76 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-
5(g)(2)(B) (Supp. 1994)) (allowing a court to grant a victim in a 
mixed-motives case declaratory and injunctive relief and to award 
him or her attorneys' fees and costs even if the employer had a 
legitimate, sufficient motive when it acted). 
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under the 1991 Act, the plaintiff is entitled to some relief even 
if the employer actually would have taken the same action at the 
same time absent any invidious motive.  See Civil Rights Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1075-76 (codified at 
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (Supp. 1994)). 
 Moreover, we think it clear that, where a federal right 
has been violated, federal courts must provide a remedy.  The 
right which is violated by an employer which discriminates on the 
basis of a protected characteristic is not the employee's right 
to the job, but the employee's right to equal, fair, and 
impartial treatment, the violation of which frequently results, 
inter alia, in a significant injury to the victim's dignity and a 
demoralizing impairment of his or her self-esteem.  See supra at 
Error! Bookmark not defined. n.Error! Bookmark not defined.; cf. 
H.R. REP. No. 40(I) at 64-65, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
602-03; Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494, 74 S. Ct. 
686, 691-92 (1954); see also Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1072-73 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 
1981a(b)(3) (Supp. 1994)) (providing a plaintiff may recover 
compensatory damages under Title VII for "emotional pain, 
suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of 
life, and other nonpecuniary losses").  The plaintiff's deceit or 
misconduct toward the employer is most appropriately considered 
in the remedies stage, or in any claim compatible with the 
federal anti-discrimination laws that the employer may properly 
assert against the employee under appropriate state or federal 
law.  See Massey, 828 F. Supp. at 323 ("[I]f the employer has 
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somehow been damaged by the plaintiff's misrepresentations or 
misconduct on the job, it may seek its own damages where 
appropriate."). 
 The Summers rationale confuses the question whether the 
employer injuriously discriminated against the employee with the 
question whether the employee had an entitlement to the job.  
Whether the employee had some "right" to the job in question is 
not an issue in a Title VII or ADEA action; the issue is whether 
the employer discriminated based on an impermissible factor.  
Besides receiving no mention in the statutes, the "property 
right" inquiry is irrelevant for the simple reason that both 
Title VII and ADEA operate against the presumed backdrop of at-
will employment, meaning that the employee is presumptively not 
entitled to the job, irrespective of résumé fraud or performance 
misconduct.  Under the traditional employment-at-will doctrine, 
an employer may discipline or terminate an employee for any 
reason or no reason.0  Thus, if entitlement to the job were a 
                     
0See, e.g., Poff v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 13 F.3d 1189, 
1191 (8th Cir. 1994) (Minnesota law); Richards v. General Motors 
Corp., 991 F.2d 1227, 1234-35 (6th Cir. 1993) (Michigan law); 
Hall v. Western Prod. Co., 988 F.2d 1050, 1058-59 (10th Cir. 
1993) (Wyoming law); Carlson v. Arnot-Ogden Memorial Hosp., 918 
F.2d 411, 414 (3d Cir. 1990) (Pennsylvania law). 
 While the federal anti-employment discrimination laws 
were not designed to impinge directly upon employer free choice, 
indirect effects are inevitable.  No doubt the federal employment 
discrimination laws have curtailed the more excessive aspects of 
the employment-at-will doctrine with respect to protected 
persons.  Now, a covered employer who arbitrarily and 
capriciously terminates a protected person without any animus 
toward the protected characteristic runs a not insubstantial risk 
of liability.  For example, the Supreme Court has intimated that 
an arbitrary and capricious rationale may not meet the employer's 
burden of rebutting a plaintiff's prima facie case of 
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prerequisite to liability or recovery, then no at-will employee 
could recover under Title VII or ADEA -- but that plainly is not 
the case. See Washington, 969 F.2d at 256 ("A `property right' in 
one's job . . . is not a requirement in a federal discrimination 
claim."). 
 What is the case is that neither Title VII nor ADEA 
strips a wrongdoing employee of his or her entitlement to 
protection against unlawful discrimination.  Instead of focusing 
on the worthiness of the victim, the statutes exclusively and 
unambiguously fix on the employer's motives.  See Alexander v. 
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51, 94 S. Ct. 1011, 1021 (1974) 
("Title VII's strictures are absolute and represent a congres-
sional command that each employee be free of discrimination." 
(emphasis supplied)); Massey, 828 F. Supp. at 323 ("There is 
nothing in [Title VII] itself to support a requirement that the 
job had been acquired honestly.").  An employee's fraud or 
misconduct, while bearing on his or her fitness for the job, 
simply does not justify, excuse, or make harmless the employer's 
intentional, invidious discrimination.  Because the Summers 
approach ignores these precepts, thereby denying remedial justice 
for a grievous injury, we reject that approach.   
                                                                  
discrimination.  See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255, 101 S. Ct. at 1094 
("The [legitimate] explanation [the defendant] provided must be 
legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant."); 
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03, 93 S. Ct. at 1824 ("We 
need not attempt in the instant case to detail every matter which 
fairly could be recognized as a reasonable basis for a refusal to 
hire.").  Nevertheless, the employment-at-will doctrine has been 
abridged only to the extent necessary to enforce the federal 
employment discrimination laws. 
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4.  Summers Ignores the Compelling Public Interest in Enforcement 
 Besides slighting the very real injury suffered by a 
victim of employment discrimination, the Summers rule disregards 
that an act of employment discrimination is much more than an 
ordinary font of tort law.  The anti-employment discrimination 
laws are suffused with a public aura for reasons that are well 
known.  Throughout this Nation's history, persons have far too 
often been judged not by their individual merit, but by the 
fortuity of their race, the color of their skin, the sex or year 
of their birth, the nation of their origin, or the religion of 
their conscientious choosing.  Congress has responded to these 
pernicious misconceptions and ignoble hatreds with humanitarian 
laws formulated to wipe out the iniquity of discrimination in 
employment, not merely to recompense the individuals so harmed 
but principally to deter future violations. 
 The anti-employment discrimination laws Congress 
enacted consequently resonate with a forceful public policy 
vilifying discrimination.0  A plaintiff in an employment-
                     
0See, e.g., Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716, 103 S. Ct. at 1482 ("The 
prohibitions against discrimination contained in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 reflect an important national policy."); Franks v. 
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 778 n.40, 96 S. Ct. 1251, 1271 
n.40 (1976) (stating that "claims under Title VII involve the 
vindication of a major public interest" (internal quotations 
omitted)); id. at 763, 96 S. Ct. at 1263 ("[Congress] ordained 
that its policy of outlawing [discrimination on the basis of 
race, religion, sex, or national origin] should have the `highest 
priority' . . . ."); Alexander, 415 U.S. at 45, 94 S. Ct. at 1018 
("[T]he private litigant not only redresses his own injury but 
also vindicates the important congressional policy against 
discriminatory employment practices."); cf. Newman v. Piggie Park 
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discrimination case accordingly acts not only to vindicate his or 
her personal interests in being made whole, but also as a 
"private attorney general" to enforce the paramount public 
interest in eradicating invidious discrimination.0 
 In sum, it appears that the employee's misconduct or 
fraud is a possible wrong against the employer, whereas the 
employer's discrimination is a wrong against the employee and 
society at large. See Massey, 828 F. Supp. at 323 ("Any concern 
                                                                  
Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S. Ct. 964, 966 (1968) (per 
curiam) (decided under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) 
(stating that Congress intended the struggle against discrimina-
tion to be a policy "of the highest priority"). 
0See EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 602, 101 
S. Ct. 817, 824 (1981) ("Congress considered the charging party a 
`private attorney general,' whose role in enforcing the ban on 
discrimination is parallel to that of the [Equal Employment 
Opportunity] Commission itself." (citing Christiansburg Garment 
Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S. Ct. 694, 700 (1978)); New 
York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 63, 100 S. Ct. 
2024, 2030-31 (1980); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody 422 U.S. 405, 
415, 95 S. Ct. 2362, 2370 (1975); Alexander, 415 U.S. at 45, 94 
S. Ct. at 1018; see also Newman, 390 U.S. at 401-02, 88 S. Ct. at 
966 (decided under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, by authorizing a court 
to grant a victim of discrimination in a mixed-motives case 
declaratory and injunctive relief and partial attorneys' fees and 
costs, Congress again recognized the public interest in 
eradicating discrimination even when the employer had acted at 
the time of its decision for a legitimate reason that would have 
propelled it to take the same actions standing alone.  See Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §107(b), 105 Stat. 1075-
76 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (Supp. 1994)).  
That is, the 1991 Act reinforces the common sense notion that, 
even if the plaintiff is entitled to no personal relief, at least 
the remedies inuring to the public's benefit -- a declaratory 
judgment, injunctive relief, and, derivatively, attorneys' fees, 
see supra (discussing the litigant's role as a private attorney 
general) -- should be considered in an after-acquired evidence 
case.  Since those remedies do not economically benefit the 
plaintiff, that provision evidences a strong public policy in 
favor of enforcement of the anti-employment discrimination laws. 
34 
we may have in awarding damages to employees who have acquired 
their jobs improperly does not outweigh the plaintiff's statutory 
right to recover . . . .").  The Summers approach unjustifiably 
exalts the employer's purely private state right above the 
employee's quasi-public federal one. 
 
5.  Non-Liability Undermines the Statutes' Purposes 
 As described supra Part 31, Congress prescribed a 
strong medicine, the anti-employment discrimination laws, to cure 
the social malady of invidious discrimination.  Deterrence is 
accomplished by placing an economic price on discriminatory acts, 
and by exposing and stigmatizing the wrongdoer's acts before the 
entire community.  We also bear in mind that, as remedial 
statutes, Title VII and ADEA should be liberally construed to 
advance their beneficent purposes.0  Unfortunately, the Summers 
approach disregards that canon of construction and frustrates the 
paramount objective of Title VII and ADEA, to deter violations of 
                     
0See, e.g., Hart v. J. T. Baker Chem. Co., 598 F.2d 829, 831 (3d 
Cir. 1979) (Title VII); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 
765-66, 99 S. Ct. 2066, 2076 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
(ADEA); Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc., 584 F.2d 
1221, 1229 (3d Cir. 1978) (in banc) (same); cf., e.g., Dennis v. 
Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443, 111 S. Ct. 865, 868 (1991) (section 
1983). 
 One overriding lesson the 1991 Act tutors all but its 
most unmindful reader is that Congress was unhappy with 
increasingly parsimonious constructions of Title VII.  
Essentially, Congress forcefully reminded courts of the canon 
that Title VII and ADEA, as remedial statutes, are to be 
construed liberally to promote their welfare purposes, equality 
of treatment and employment opportunities. 
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the law.0  See Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1180-81; cf. Price 
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 265, 109 S. Ct. at 1798 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) (stating that if "an illegitimate criterion was a 
substantial factor in an adverse employment decision, the 
deterrent purpose of [Title VII] has clearly been triggered." 
(emphasis in original)). 
 A strong deterrence policy is the needed stimulus to 
propel otherwise indifferent employers into taking affirmative 
steps to educate and discipline members of their workforce 
insensitive to or disdainful of their co-workers' civil rights.  
Economic penalties work as reliable engines to drive home 
forcefully to rational employers the seriousness and solemnity of 
our national policy denouncing discrimination, and thereby 
inspire affirmative responses.  See Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 
417-18, 95 S. Ct. at 2371-72 ("It is the reasonably certain 
prospect of a backpay award that provide[s] the spur or catalyst 
which causes employers . . . to self-examine and to self-evaluate 
their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far 
                     
0"The `primary objective' of Title VII is to bring employment 
discrimination to an end."  Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 
228, 102 S. Ct. 3057, 3063 (1982) (citing Albemarle Paper, 422 
U.S. at 417, 95 S. Ct. at 2371); see 28 U.S.C.A. § 621(b) (1985) 
(listing the purposes of ADEA, including "to prohibit arbitrary 
age discrimination in employment"); Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 
F.2d 901, 905 (3d Cir. 1977) ("The primary purpose behind [ADEA] 
is to prevent age discrimination in hiring and discharging 
workers."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1008, 98 S. Ct. 717 (1978).  
Compensating victims to make them whole, while also of great 
weight, is a secondary objective.  See Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. 
at 417-18, 95 S. Ct. at 2371-72; cf. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 364, 
97 S. Ct. at 1869 (stating that the deterrence and compensatory 
purposes are "equally important"). 
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as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious 
page in this country's history." (internal quotations omitted)); 
cf. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1506 & n.35 
(1994) (recognizing that liability impacts "private parties' 
planning"); City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 575, 106 
S. Ct. 2686, 2694 (1986) (plurality) (section 1983) (stating that 
"the damages a plaintiff recovers contribute significantly to the 
deterrence of civil rights violations in the future").0 
                     
0On the other hand, allowing employees or applicants who 
committed fraud or misbehaved on the job to prevail will not 
notably diminish their disincentive to wrong or deceive their 
employers or their prospective employers.  It seems unreasonable 
to attribute to the wrongdoing employee or applicant the strategy 
to lie to or cheat his or her employer or prospective employer 
with the expectation that, if the employer unlawfully 
discriminates against him or her, it will not be able to use that 
wrongful conduct against him or her if discovered in the course 
of the resulting proceedings.  See Massey, 828 F. Supp. at 322 
n.10 ("We find it preposterous that an employee would refrain 
from lying [on a résumé or employment application] because she 
anticipates that she may be illegally discriminated against later 
and wants to preserve her right to recover damages.").  
Applicants misrepresent their qualifications in order to secure 
the employment in the first place, a powerful incentive that will 
not be curtailed by the unlikely prospect, of which the great 
bulk of applicants and employees will be unaware, that the 
employer may discover the falsehood in an employment discrimina-
tion action and will be able to exploit it to bar the employee's 
or applicant's claim.  The applicant's incentive not to be 
dishonest, and the employee's incentive not to breach his or her 
duties of truthfulness, loyalty, and obedience, stem from the 
fact that he or she is always subject to disciplinary measures if 
the employer learns of the wrong outside the context of discovery 
in an employment discrimination case.  The only applicant or 
employee incentive that will wane if after-acquired evidence is 
allowed to bar all liability is the plaintiff's vindication of 
his or her federal rights when he or she is unlawfully 
discriminated against, even where the discrimination is ongoing, 
especially since any attorney the plaintiff might consult would 
presumably become aware of the rule. 
 We note in passing that many employers in fact 
responsibly investigate applicants across-the-board before hiring 
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 Of course, the efficacy of the after-acquired evidence 
tactic has not escaped the attention of defense counsel, some of 
whom have recommended that, to maximize a client's odds of 
success, defense counsel's first step when defending an 
employment discrimination claim should be thoroughly to 
investigate the plaintiff's background and job performance.  
Indeed, many have instructed employers on specific policies they 
can implement to erect the strongest possible defense in 
employment discrimination suits, and, if recognized, one can 
anticipate the extensive and effective use of the after-acquired 
evidence doctrine.0  The prospect of a defendant's thorough 
                                                                  
someone, and that the employer's need for truthful employment 
applications has been sharpened with the spread of employer 
liability for "negligent hiring." An employment-discrimination 
suit brought by a discharged employee or unsuccessful applicant, 
however, does not provide a sound business (as opposed to litiga-
tion) reason for the employer to begin investigating its ex-
employee's or applicant's honesty and fidelity. 
0See James A. Burstein & Steven L. Hamann, Better Late Than Never 
-- After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Cases, 19 
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 193, 202-03 (1993) ("[A]fter-acquired evidence 
should be factored in crafting personnel policies.  Foremost 
among the considerations is to ensure that applications and 
employee manuals expressly state that resumé fraud or application 
misrepresentations will result in suspension pending discharge. 
. . . Second, a prompt and thorough investigation of a 
complaint's discrimination charge should be conducted."); David 
D. Kadue & William J. Dritsas, The Use of After-Acquired Evidence 
in Employee Misconduct and Resume Fraud Cases, 1993 LAB. L.J. 
531, 531 [hereinafter Kadue & Dritsas, The Use of After-Acquired 
Evidence] (stating that when an employee sues for employment 
discrimination, commonly "the employer investigates the former 
employee's background with special care"); George D. Mesritz, 
"After-Acquired" Evidence of Pre-Employment Representations:  An 
Effective Defense Against Wrongful Discharge Claims, 18 EMPLOYEE 
REL. L.J. 215, 215, 222-25 (1992) ("Management should respond to 
this favorable development [-- the judicial recognition of the 
after-acquired evidence doctrine --] by routinely searching for 
pre-employment misrepresentations as a potential defense in all 
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inquiry into the details of a plaintiff's pre- and post-hiring 
conduct, however, may chill the enthusiasm and frequency with 
which employment discrimination claims are pursued, even in cases 
where the victim of discrimination has nothing to hide, let alone 
cases where the potential plaintiff is not entirely blameless.0  
Placed in context of the general pervasiveness of résumé fraud 
and employee misconduct,0 the likely consequence of the wide-
                                                                  
discharge litigation.  Employers in turn should maximize the 
probability that `after-acquired' evidence is available as a 
defense by revising employment applications to elicit even more 
specific information."); Robert M. Shea, Posttermination 
Discovery of Employee Misconduct:  A New Defense in Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, 17 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 103, 103-04, 109 
(1991) [hereinafter Shea, Posttermination Discovery of Employee 
Misconduct] (explaining that Summers "gives employers a legal 
basis and, more importantly, a good reason for taking a broader 
approach to discovery in employment discrimination litigation" 
and advising employers to "scrutinize representations made by the 
plaintiff during the hiring process" and to look for "previously 
undiscovered misconduct"); William S. Waldo & Rosemary A. Mahar, 
Lost Cause and Found Defense:  Using Evidence Discovered After an 
Employee's Discharge to Bar Discrimination Claims, 9 LAB. LAW. 31, 
32, 40-42 (1993) (advising defense counsel to "leave no stone 
unturned in ferreting out any evidence" of résumé fraud or 
employment misconduct by conducting "a thorough post-termination 
investigation"). 
0See Massey, 828 F. Supp. at 323 (reasoning that "the use of 
after acquired evidence to bar a discrimination claim in its 
entirety could cause employees who did something wrong in the 
past to quietly endure discriminatory treatment rather than 
complain, regardless of how long ago the misconduct occurred or 
its triviality").  Moreover, the inevitable "fishing expedition[] 
. . . for `minor, trivial or technical infractions,'" Washington, 
969 F.2d at 256 (quoting O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 745 F. 
Supp. 656 (D. Utah 1990)), might curtail the success of victims 
of employment discrimination in bringing lawsuits and thereby 
erode the effectiveness of Title VII and ADEA.  See, e.g., 
McKennon, 9 F.3d at 540-41 & nn.1 & 3 (describing the employer's 
masterful use of after-acquired evidence). 
0By all accounts, résumé fraud is a serious and recurrent problem 
facing employers.  See, e.g., Mitchell H. Rubinstein, The Use of 
Predischarge Misconduct Discovered After an Employee['s] 
Termination as a Defense in Employment Litigation, 24 SUFFOLK U. 
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spread exploitation of after-acquired evidence will be underen-
forcement of Title VII and ADEA, and consequently underdeterrence 
of discriminatory employment practices.0 
 This leads us to a final reason why liability is proper 
in a Title VII or ADEA after-acquired evidence case, namely, the 
other paramount objective of those statutes "`to make persons 
whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment 
discrimination.'" Franks, 424 U.S. at 763, 96 S. Ct. at 1264 
(quoting Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 418, 95 S. Ct. at 2372); 
see id. at 764, 96 S. Ct. at 1264 (stating that the plaintiff 
should be made "whole insofar as possible"); see Albemarle Paper, 
422 U.S. at 418-21, 95 S. Ct. at 2372-73; supra at Error! 
Bookmark not defined. n.Error! Bookmark not defined..  Of course, 
the corollary to the make-whole directive is that the protected 
                                                                  
L. REV. 1, 1 n.2 (1990); Shea, Posttermination Discovery of 
Employee Misconduct, 17 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. at 403 n.3; Zemelman, 
The After-Acquired Evidence Defense, 46 STAN. L. REV. at 176 n.5; 
see also Douglas L. Williams & Julia A. Davis, Title VII Update 
-- Skeletons and a Double-Edged Sword, C669 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 303, 
305 (1991) ("At one time or another probably every employee 
commits an infraction at work and hopes that the boss never finds 
out."). 
0Some courts have tried to deal with the problem of 
underenforcement by requiring the fraud or misconduct to be 
material before accepting the employer's defense, see, e.g., 
O'Driscoll, 12 F.3d at 180, but the meaning of materiality has 
not been settled.  For example, at least one court confronted 
with a boilerplate attestation clause in an employment 
application has held that the misrepresentation itself, whether 
material or not standing alone, became material by virtue of the 
clause, rendering the materiality requirement largely 
meaningless.  See Milligan-Jensen, 975 F.2d at 303-04 & nn. 1 & 
2; cf. Johnson, 955 F.2d at 414 (holding that an employer's 
asserted actual reliance upon the plaintiff's misrepresentation 
made it material as a matter of law); Gilty, 919 F.2d at 1251 
(holding that a plaintiff's misrepresentation ipso facto rendered 
him unqualified for the job). 
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employee is not to be catapulted into a better position than he 
or she would have enjoyed had the employer not acted unlawfully.  
See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259, 101 S. Ct. at 1096 ("Title VII 
. . . does not demand that an employer give preferential 
treatment 
to minorities or women."); cf. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285-86, 
97 S. Ct. at 575.   
 Keeping in mind the aspiration, then, that the 
plaintiff should be left in the same position as he or she was in 
before the discrimination, the bottom line is straightforward.  
On the one hand, holding the employer liable and providing the 
victim appropriately fashioned remedies would restore the victim 
to his or her prior position, not a better one than had he or she 
not suffered from unlawful discrimination.  On the other hand, 
barring all remedies would leave the victim in a worse position 
than had the employer not unlawfully discriminated against him or 
her (in which case the employee assumedly would still be 
employed), and elevates the employer to a superior position 
insofar as it lets the employer get off scot-free despite its 
blameworthy conduct.  These two observations hold true especially 
in instances where the employer's discovery of the after-acquired 
evidence was brought about due to the legal proceedings 
instituted in response to the employer's wrongful acts, since in 
those cases, absent the discrimination, the employer may never 
have discovered the evidence (or at least not until some 
indeterminate future time).  See Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1179-80; 
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Welch, 23 F.3d at WL at *3 (Arnold, J., dissenting);0 cf. John 
Cuneo, Inc., 298 N.L.R.B. 856, 856 (1990).  In short, a major 
weakness of the Summers approach is that it does not restore a 
victim to the position he or she would have occupied but for the 
discrimination. 
 
6.  Summary 
 For all the foregoing reasons, we hold that after-
acquired evidence is inadmissible, because irrelevant, at the 
liability stage of a cause of action brought under Title VII or 
ADEA.  We do not rule out the potentiality that such evidence may 
                     
0We think that Judge Arnold got the better of the argument in his 
dissent in Welch: 
 
I respectfully suggest that the court errs in 
concluding that if defendant can show that it would 
never have hired Mr. Welch but for his 
misrepresentation, then Mr. Welch will be in no worse 
position than he would have been but for the alleged 
illegal act.  The crucial points are that the defendant 
did hire him and did not know of the facts that might 
have led to Mr. Welch's discharge until it discovered 
them because suit was filed against it.  The defendant 
might never have learned of those facts, or it might 
have learned of them fortuitously at some later time.  
Until it did so, those facts could hardly provide an 
excuse for termination, since they could not have 
provided any part of the defendant's motive.  If Mr. 
Welch is not compensated for losses suffered between 
the time he would have been fired on account of the 
discovery of relevant facts, he is not in the same 
position he would have been in but for a wrong commit-
ted against him, and the purpose of the protective 
legislation is entirely lost. 
 . . . The plaintiff does not seek to benefit 
from his misrepresentation, if any.  He seeks simply to 
have the law applied to him in an evenhanded way. 
 
Id. at ____ *3. 
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serve as the foundation for a claim of fraud, conversion, or the 
like by the employer against the plaintiff in an appropriate 
forum, but only that it may not be introduced substantively for 
the purpose of defending against liability. We must accordingly 
reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment to 
Harleysville and remand for further consideration. 
 
B.  The Remedies Stage 
 Because the district court must proceed further with 
this case and may well have to reach the remedies stage, for the 
guidance of that court on remand we will make a few comments 
about the remedies facet of the case.  We note in this regard 
that the questions of how the after-acquired evidence may be used 
harmoniously with Title VII's and ADEA's language and goals, and 
of what remedies should inure to a plaintiff in an after-acquired 
evidence case, seem to be far more stubborn than the liability 
issue. 
 First, after-acquired evidence of résumé and/or 
application fraud or employer misconduct on the job is relevant 
to at least some issues at the remedies stage (and hence is 
admissible at that point), even if it has surfaced after the 
employer's searching inquiry in the aftermath of the employer's 
unlawful conduct or in the course of its trial preparation.0  The 
                     
0We observe that in a normal Title VII or ADEA case, evidence 
acquired before the adverse employment decision might, as a 
prophlactic measure, be inadmissible altogether if the plaintiff 
could show that the employer had a practice of thoroughly 
investigating the information provided in employment applications 
and interviews by, and of comprehensively reviewing on-the-job 
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court should, of course, be cautious lest the remedies evidence 
affect the liability verdict. 
 Second, at the remedies stage, the district court must 
bear in mind Title VII's and ADEA's two principal objects:  
deterrence and compensation.  See Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 
421, 95 S. Ct. at 2373; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 
429-30, 91 S. Ct. 849, 853 (1971); supra at Error! Bookmark not 
                                                                  
performance of, only or primarily only the members of a protected 
class with the motive to discover flaws justifying an adverse 
employment action, for such a practice would probably contravene 
Title VII and ADEA.  Assuming it were so, since the filing of the 
lawsuit would appear to be an activity protected to the same 
extent as membership in another protected class, see 42 U.S.C.A. 
§2000e-3(a) (1981) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice 
for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or 
applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed any 
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, 
or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or 
hearing under this subchapter."); 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(d) (1985) 
(similar), it would seem to follow that the aforementioned 
defense strategy of investigating employees who file complaints 
with the intent to discover evidence retroactively justifying or 
excusing the adverse employment decision may itself violate Title 
VII and ADEA, and if so it might be contrary to the design of 
those statutes to allow the employer to benefit from (introduce) 
such evidence. 
 Accordingly, an argument could be made that such 
evidence should be excluded from consideration as the fruits of 
unlawful retaliation even in the remedies stage of a Title VII or 
ADEA suit. That is, if it were the case that the calculated 
discovery of after-acquired evidence (as opposed to, for example, 
its inadvertent or independent discovery) amounts to retaliation 
under Title VII or ADEA, although it is exceedingly unlikely that 
any economic damages would flow therefrom, it may very well be 
that any evidence so stained would have to be suppressed at the 
remedies stage of the proceedings, except perhaps to show that 
reinstatement would threaten the public health, safety, or 
welfare, or would otherwise violate a public policy on par with 
the one antithetical to employment discrimination.  This 
argument, however, was not advanced in this case until oral 
argument, and we shall decline to further consider it. 
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defined. n.Error! Bookmark not defined..  Congress has from Title 
VII's inception expected courts to fashion remedies guided by the 
acts' twin central goals.  See Franks, 424 U.S. at 763-64, 96 S. 
Ct. at 1263-64.  To advance these goals, a district court is 
under the "`duty to render a decree which will so far as possible 
eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar 
like discrimination in the future.'" Franks, 424 U.S. at 770, 96 
S. Ct. at 1267 (quoting Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 418, 95 S. 
Ct. at 2372).0 
                     
0The same standard applies under ADEA.  As we explained in 
Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 
436 U.S. 913, 98 S. Ct. 2254 (1978): 
 
 Monetary awards exacted from employers who 
practice unlawful discrimination serve two primary 
functions.  First, the prospect of economic penalties 
more certainly deters illegal employment practice[s] 
than does exposure to injunctive relief or prospective 
equitable remedies such as reinstatement.  Second, 
economic exactions recompense individuals for injuries 
inflicted by employers' discriminatory conduct.  These 
prophylactic and compensatory purposes are the basis of 
most recent anti-employment discrimination legislation, 
including the ADEA and Title VII.  Thus, the Supreme 
Court's mandate on the exercise of trial court's 
discretion in granting monetary relief in Title VII 
suits . . . is equally compelling in the context of 
ADEA actions . . . . 
 The make whole standard of relief should be the 
touchstone for the district courts in fashioning both 
legal and equitable remedies in age discrimination 
cases.  Victims of discrimination are entitled to be 
restored to the economic position they would have 
occupied but for the intervening unlawful conduct of 
employers. 
 
Id. at 1237-38 (citations omitted). 
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 Third, we illustrate these points with respect to the 
most common remedy, backpay.  The Supreme Court has laid down the 
general rule under Title VII that 
given a finding of unlawful discrimination, backpay 
should be denied only for reasons which, if applied 
generally, would not frustrate the central statutory 
purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the 
economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered 
through past discrimination. 
Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 421, 95 S. Ct. at 2373, quoted in 
Franks, 424 U.S. at 771, 96 S. Ct. at 1267.  We have applied the 
same standard to ADEA.  See Rodriguez, 569 F.2d at 1238 (quoting 
Albemarle Paper as quoted supra).  But some courts cut backpay 
off prematurely at the moment the employer obtains the after-
acquired evidence.  See, e.g., Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice 
Co., 985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993); Smith, 876 F.2d at 1319 n.2 
(dicta); cf. John Cuneo, 298 N.L.R.B. at 856.  This formula is, 
however, inconsistent with the effectuation of the statutes' 
deterrent and compensatory purposes, and we favor the normal rule 
that, when otherwise appropriate, backpay should be awarded until 
the date of judgment.  Accord Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1182; Massey, 
828 F. Supp. at 323. 
 We reach this result by considering the statutory 
policies at stake.  Insofar as after-acquired evidence is 
uncovered during the legal dispute and would not have been 
discovered, at least for an indeterminate stretch of time, absent 
the employer's unlawful acts, the plaintiff would be left in a 
worse position because of the discrimination if the court were to 
make use of that evidence to limit the victim's remedies, and the 
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make-whole compensatory goal of the acts would not be reached.  
Confining backpay to the discovery date would also dilute the 
deterrent effect of Title VII and ADEA, an effect best promoted 
with an award of backpay, see supra (quoting Albemarle Paper). 
 On the other end of the scale weighs the policy of 
allowing employers free choice (primarily encroached on by 
reinstatement rather than by an award of backpay), see, e.g., 
Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 527 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (citing cases), and the difficulty in ignoring such 
evidence insofar as it could be read as condoning the employee's 
misbehavior, cf. Summers, 864 F.2d at 708 ("To argue . . . that 
this after-acquired evidence should be ignored is utterly 
unrealistic.").  But the fact that courts will not turn a blind 
eye to employee fraud and misconduct is adequately demonstrated 
in cases where the employer in fact bases its adverse employment 
decision on the employee's wrongful actions, because then the 
evidence is fully considered at every stage of the dispute, and 
also perhaps in context of other remedies (like reinstatement) in 
after-acquired evidence cases. 
 There are occasions, of course, when after-acquired 
evidence is useful in measuring backpay:  if the employer can 
somehow insulate its illegal actions from its discovery of the 
disfavorable evidence, it is free to act on it (keeping in mind 
the prohibition against retaliation, see supra at Error! Bookmark 
not defined. n.Error! Bookmark not defined.) to discipline its 
employee, as there would be no causation.  One example is where 
the employer would have inevitably discovered the evidence in the 
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normal progression of things (that is, assuming no litigation).0  
Alternatively, the employer may happen upon the evidence 
completely independently of any investigation prompted by the 
discriminatory employment action or its aftermath, including the 
legal proceedings.0  Proof of either of these occurring would 
entitle an employer to cut off all further liability from the 
time the employer can establish with reasonable certainty the 
date of the inevitable or independent discovery, so long as the 
employer additionally shows that based upon that evidence it 
indeed would have taken the same employment action at that time.  
See Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1182 (ending backpay at the earlier of 
(i) the date of judgment, and (ii) the date the employer can show 
it would have discovered evidence, independently of the adverse 
employment decision and the ensuing litigation, which would have 
                     
0See, e.g., Rodriguez, 431 U.S. at 403 n.9, 97 S. Ct. at 1897 n.9 
(allowing the company to prove at trial that the applicant "would 
not have been hired in any event"); Sabree, 921 F.2d at 405 
(reducing damages if the employer would have inevitably 
discovered that the plaintiff was ineligible for a transfer); 
Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 614, 626-27 (4th 
Cir.) (holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to backpay 
because the employer would have inevitably discovered his prior 
misconduct and would not have hired him even had it not 
discriminated against him), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832, 105 S. 
Ct. 120 (1984).  But see Summers, 864 F.2d at 707 n.3 ("[T]he 
probability that Summers' transgressions would have been 
discovered in the absence of the trial is immaterial."). 
0See Gilty, 919 F.2d at 1249, 1255-56 (holding that a discharge 
was not retaliatory because a new police chief independently 
undertook a comprehensive review of all the city's officers' 
credentials); cf. Welch, 23 F.3d at WL at *3 (Arnold, J., 
dissenting) (referring to the defendant's "fortuitous" discovery 
of the evidence). 
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led it to take the same adverse action with respect to the 
employee); Massey, 828 F. Supp. at 324 (same).0 
 Fourth, we must stress in terms of policy the 
importance of the background rule of employer free choice.  The 
federal anti-employment discrimination laws were designed not to 
impinge directly upon employer free choice; that is, not to 
interfere unnecessarily with legitimate business operations and 
decisions.  See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259, 101 S. Ct. at 1096 
("[Title VII] was not intended to `diminish traditional 
management prerogatives.'" (quoting United Steelworkers v. Weber, 
442 U.S. 193, 207, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2729 (1979)); Price 
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242, 109 S. Ct. at 1786 (stressing that 
an "important aspect of [Title VII] is its preservation of an 
employer's remaining freedom of choice").  For example, the 
federal employment discrimination laws do not alter the 
employment-at-will doctrine except in limited respects.  See 
supra at 30 & n.Error! Bookmark not defined..  Their goal instead 
is to restore the victim of the employer's illegal conduct to the 
position he or she would have occupied absent the discrimination.  
                     
0For example, if the inevitable or independent discovery would 
have preceded an applicant's hiring, probably no back pay would 
be due.  See Smallwood, 728 F.2d at 626.  By contrast, declar-
atory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys' fees, properly 
apportioned, might still be available.  Moreover, in cases 
governed by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the plaintiff might 
also be able to recover compensatory damages and, if the employer 
acted "with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally 
protected rights of an aggrieved individual," punitive damages, 
see Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 
Stat. 1072-73 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §1981a(a)(1), (b)(1) 
(Supp. 1994)), irrespective of inevitable or independent 
discovery. 
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Thus, where an equitable remedy, such as reinstatement, would be 
particularly invasive of the employer's "traditional management 
prerogatives," the after-acquired evidence may bar that remedy.  
Cf. supra at Error! Bookmark not defined. n.Error! Bookmark not 
defined.. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the district 
court's order granting summary judgment to Harleysville, and 
remand the case to the district court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
